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”So far as concerns the present question, the end
sought by accumulation is to rank high in compari-
son with the rest of the community in point of pe-
cuniary strength.” - Veblen (1899)
”[...] and the means of showing pecuniary strength
and so of gaining or regaining a good name, are
leisure and conspicuous consumption of goods.” -
Veblen (1899)
1 Introduction
In this paper we build a simple two-stage game to account for the consequences of two
behavioral assumptions made in the spirit of Veblen. In the first stage, homogenous
individuals decide on their income (hence, on their effort to obtain that income) at
the aim of reaching a high rank in comparison with the rest of the community. They
are driven by what we refer to as Getting Ahead of the Smithes (GAS). This is the
social competition game which explains financial accumulation in Veblen’s Theory of
the Leisure Class (1899). At the second stage participants decide on their conspicuous
consumption (which has no intrinsic value) in order to signal their rank to society.
As in Veblen (idem), conspicuous consumption is the means of showing pecuniary
strength. The signalling game in which individuals engage provides a rationale for
rich people consuming apparently useless goods.
The main insights of our contribution are as follows. First, the ”indirect” utilities,
deduced from the equilibrium of the signalling game, have a ”Keeping Up with the
Joneses” - KUJ, henceforth - ”cardinal” form.1 More precisely, according to these
reduced utilities derived from the ”ordinal” principle social concerns reflect the ”pure
pride” feeling. Individuals behave as if they were preoccupied by the gap between their
own income and the average income in the population of lower ranked participants
(Friedman and Ostrov, 2008). In other words, KUJ is an outcome of GAS . The
intuition behind this finding is that signalling costs grow with the incomes of lower-
ranked individuals. This result is welcome, since the KUJ version of relative concerns
1See Hopkins (2008) for a detailed distinction between the ”cardinal” and ”ordinal” versions of
relative concerns.
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sounds ”ad hoc”, whereas assuming that people worry about their income rank, the so-
called GAS behavior, is quite plausible and indirectly confirmed by empirical papers
in the spirit of Easterlin (1974). Second, the equilibrium distribution of income is
non-degenerate. This result means that the desire for (advantageous) inequality is
sufficient to explain income inequalities across ex ante identical individuals. The
reason is that in a situation of income equality, an individual would find it profitable
to get ahead of everybody by increasing his/her income.
Another noticeable result is that this unequal-income equilibrium is an egalitarian
optimum in terms of utilities. This means that whoever dislikes true inequalities, that
is inequalities in terms of utility, should like observed (gross) income inequalities, and
should then oppose any redistributive tax policy. But true equality is costly. We
show that there is a single utilitarian (social) optimum, relative to which all effort is
lower than in the case of laissez-faire. As in Gavrel and Rebiere (2015), this is the
consequence of a social rat-race phenomenon. But in our setup, the costs of making
income visible (deduced from the signalling game) tend to moderate this distortion.
This implies that perfect information can degrade welfare.
We believe that our contribution clarifies this line of research in the literature on
status game. As the introductory quotes make clear, one cannot understand conspic-
uous consumption when incomes are known to everybody. Conversely, when incomes
are public information, one can conceive a social competition game without conspic-
uous consumption. As Veblen points out, conspicuous consumption is valueless in a
small community whose members know everything about everybody. In addition in-
dividuals do not necessarily feel any need to make their income rank known. Knowing
that they are the ”best” may be sufficient for them.
As far as we are aware, papers (closely) related to the present one restrict analysis
to the signalling game (see for instance Hopkins and Korienko, 2004 and Ireland,
2001), which means that the distribution of incomes is exogenous. On the other hand,
Gavrel and Rebiere (2015) restrict analysis to the social competition game, which a
priori means that the ranks of individuals in the income hierarchy are assumed to be
common knowledge.
Our investigation is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our setting and solves
the signalling game. Section 3 shows how KUJ can be seen as an outcome of GAS
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and derives the equilibrium of the (reduced) social competition game. An analysis of
the welfare properties of equilibrium is exposed in section 4, while section 5 extends
the analysis to a more general setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 Environment and signalling equilibrium
In this economy, there is a ”very large number” (a continuum whose measure is
normalized to one) of identical individuals whose peculiarity is that they are sensible
to their rank in the income hierarchy. Their utility grows with an increase in the share
of participants whose incomes are lower than their own. In the first stage, referred
to as the social competition game, individuals decide on their income, y. Their effort
is an increasing function, E(y), of their income. This effort function is assumed to
be strictly convex such that E(0) = 0, and whose derivative E ′(y) satisfies E ′(0) = 0
as well as E ′(∞) = ∞. The second stage is a signalling game in which the income
distribution F (y) is common knowledge. But, as incomes are private information,
participants are led to dedicate part of their income to conspicuous consumption,
c, in order to make their rank visible. The rest (y − c) is dedicated to ”ordinary
consumption” which, contrary to conspicuous consumption, has an intrinsic value.
Consider an individual whose rank is r in the interval [0, 1]. His/her utility, u(y, r, c)
is assumed to be
u(y, r, c) = −E(y) + (α + βS(r))(y − c)
In this expression for utility, the ”social multiplier”, S(.), is an increasing concave
function of r (S ′(r) > 0, S”(r) ≤ 0). In equilibrium, the rank of an individual
with income y will coincide with the share, F (y), of lower-income participants. The
component α(y−c) (α > 0) reflects the fact that ordinary consumption also increases
utility independently of the rank in the income scale. With no loss in generality, the
top, S(1), is set to one while the bottom, S(0), is lower than one. Parameter β is a
positive scalar. In the present section and in the next, the share (the measure of the
set) of individuals with equal income is zero, whatever this income might be. Section
4 allows for mass points in the definition of S(.).
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The equilibrium of the signalling game is a relation, c = c(y), between income and
conspicuous consumption. From the second stage (signalling) equilibrium, one can
deduce individuals’ indirect (i.e. reduced) utility which only depends on their own
income and the income distribution, F (.). With these indirect utility functions, the
first stage game becomes static.
Let us solve this signalling game. To that end, the analysis is restricted to the
case in which the density, F ′(y), is positive on the range [m,M ] . We show that
any income distribution, F (.), is associated with a single conspicuous consumption
function, c(.), which makes incomes visible. This means that an individual whose
conspicuous consumption is c has the income y = c−1(c).
Let G(c(z)) denote the share of individuals whose positional consumption is lower
than c(z). Suppose that for each observed consumption, c = c(y), society will ”de-
duce” that the individual has an income of y. Assuming that c(·) is strictly increasing2
the rank of an individual who decides on conspicuous consumption c(z) coincides with
the share of participants who have an income lower than z.3 Since F (.) is common
knowledge, it follows that G(c(z)) = F (z).
As incomes are given at this stage, the utility of an y-individual who chooses positional
consumption c(z) only depends on
V (z, y, c(.)) = [α + βS(G(c(z)))] (y − c(z)) = [α + βS(F (z))] (y − c(z)). (1)
Each unit of income spent on ordinary consumption, (y − c), provides a utility of
α+ βS(F (z). The higher the consumption c(z) of the positional good, for any given
z, the less the individual will benefit from consuming the normal good. Thus the
term [α + βS(F (z))] c(z) is a utility loss which represents the cost of mimicking the
behavior of z-participants.
Consistency requires that y−individuals truthful, in the sense that their conspic-
uous consumption should be equal to c (y). In other words, a (deviant) y-individual
should not be prompted to mimic the behavior of some z-individual, whether z is
2A priori, to be a perfect signal, c(.) only needs to be reversible. It could then be decreasing,
but this case is easy to rule out.
3The hypothesis that c′(·) > 0 implies that all z-individuals, with z 6= y, reveal their income
correctly when deciding on their conspicuous consumption.
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higher or lower than y. Therefore, the derivative of V (.) with respect to z should be
zero at z = y for all y in the support of F (·):
∂V (z, y, c(.))
∂z
|z=y = βS ′(G(c(y)))G′(c(y))c′(y)(y−c(y))−[α+βS(G(c(y)))]c′(y) = 0
(2)
Since G(c(y)) then coincides with F (y) for all y in [m,M ], it follows that
βS ′(F (y))F ′(y)(y − c(y))− [α + βS(F (y))]c′(y) = 0 (3)
The previous equation is referred to as the “marginal” truth-telling condition. Know-
ing that mimicking a higher ranked z-individual means consuming more of the posi-
tional good, the marginal utility loss, [α + βS(F (y))]c′(y), from increasing the posi-
tional consumption must equal the marginal benefit of y-individual from consuming
the normal good, namely βS ′(F (y))F ′(y), when z = y.
Using
{[α + βS(F (y))] c(y)}′ = βS ′(F (y))F ′(y)c(y) + [α + βS(F (y))]c′(y) (4)
the first-order condition at z = y is rewritten as:
{[α + βS(F (y))] c(y)}′ = βS ′(F (y))F ′(y)y (5)
From the first order condition of y-participants, we obtain that their utility loss, which
reflects the cost of making their income visible, satisfies the condition:
[α + βS(F (y))]c(y) = (α + βS(0))c(m) + β
∫ y
m
S ′(F (z))F ′(z)zdz,∀y ∈ (m,M ] . (6)
An interesting and intuitive point is that the cost of making income y observable
depends on the incomes of lower-ranked agents. This is because the incentive of
a low-ranked individual mimicking highly-ranked individuals is all the stronger the
higher his/her income is. Consequently, his/her conspicuous consumption should grow
with his/her income. But, the positional consumption of highly ranked individuals
should be greater than that of low-ranked ones. This explains why the conspicuous
6
consumption of an individual grows with the increase of income for lower-ranked
participants.
Substituting (6) into the utility function, we can rewrite the latter as
V (z, y, F (.), c(m)) = [α + βS(F (z))] y−β
∫ z
m
S ′(F (t))F ′(t)tdt−(α+βS(0))c(m) (7)
We see that
∂V (z, y, .)
∂z
= βS ′(F (z))F ′(z) (y − z) (8)
It emerges that this derivative is strictly positive for z < y and strictly negative for
z > y. This means that z = y is a global maximum of the function for all y in ]m,M ].
In other words, telling the truth is optimal.
Further, writing c(y) from (6) and differentiating, we obtain:
c′(y) [α + βS(F (y))]2 = β [α + βS(F (y))]S ′(F (y))F ′(y)[y − c(y)]. (9)
This proves that the consistency requirement, that c′(y) > 0, is fulfilled.
To conclude the derivation of the signalling equilibrium, we show that, in con-
formity with intuition, the positional consumption c(m) of lower-income individuals
(y ≤ m) falls to zero. Suppose that the social belief is that this consumption is pos-
itive (c(m) ≥ 0). From equation (8), we can deduce that individuals will not decide
on higher conspicuous expenditure. As their rank (zero) cannot be lower, this implies
that they will set this expenditure to zero. Consequently, to be consistent, the social
belief should be that c(m) = 0. Conversely, individuals whose incomes are higher
than M , who cannot improve their rank, decide on conspicuous consumption c(M).4
To summarize, we can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the social belief is that y ≤ m if c = 0, y ≥M if c = c(M)





α + βS(F (z))
,∀z ∈ (m,M ] . (10)
4In equilibrium, the (measure of the) set of individuals whose income is outside [m,M ] reduces
to zero. Nonetheless, any income y ≥ 0 should be associated with a reduced utility U(y, .).
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Then this consumption pattern forms a unique equilibrium for the signalling game.
3 Indirect utilities and equilibrium
3.1 KUJ as an outcome of GAS
Anticipating his/her second-stage rational decision (and so using (7) with c(m) = 0)),
each individual derives an indirect (or reduced) utility function. Let us consider the
benchmark case where S(F (.)) = F (.). Under this assumption, agents’ payoffs are
given by
U(y, F (.)) = −E(y) + V (y, .) = −E(y) + αy + β
∫ y
m
F ′(z)(y − z)dz. (11)
It is worth comparing the previous expression for utility with the so-called cardinal
version as proposed by Friedman and Ostrov (2008) (F0, henceforth). In this paper,








with x being (ordinary) consumption and F (.), the corresponding c.d.f. The positive
parameter γ is lower or equal to one.
Suppose γ = 1/2 and let x¯ denote the average consumption of the population. In
this particular case, the FO criterion coincides with the usual KUJ version of rela-
tive concerns: FO = KUJ = 1/2(x − x¯). In general, one can distinguish between
two terms in the FO criterion. The first integral, which is positive, reflects a feeling
of “pride”, while the second integral translates a feeling of ”envy”. One interesting
outcome is that, assuming that the social multiplier, S(.),coincides with F (.), the
”pride” motivation (γ = 1)) (in terms of incomes) is a particular case of the first
stage (indirect) utilities in our setting (see equation (11)). In other words, assuming
that people are preoccupied with their rank in the income hierarchy, and that their
conspicuous consumption make their rank visible, this gives rise to a static game in
which individuals behave as if they were driven by the pure ”pride” motivation in
deciding on their income (i.e their effort). This outcome is close in spirit to Bilancini
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and Boncinelli (2014). In a marriage setup, these authors show that allowing for
asymmetric information leads to reduced preferences for social status that induce con-
cern not only for one’s own rank in the distribution of attributes, but also for how
much higher or lower one’s attribute is.
3.2 Social competition equilibrium
We here solve the static reduced game without making use of the above specification
of social concerns. In other words, the social multiplier S(.) is a strictly increasing
function, such that 0 < S(0) < 1 and S(1) = 1. Using (7) with c(m) = 0, at the first
stage of the social game, individuals’ reduced utilities, U(y, .) = −E(y) +V (y, .), can
be written as
U(y, F (.)) = −E(y) + . [α + βS(F (y))] y − β
∫ y
m
S ′(F (z))F ′(z)zdz (12)
In the social competition stage participants decide on their income by maximizing
U(y, .) for a given distribution F (.). A global equilibrium - i.e. an equilibrium of the
static reduced game - can be defined as below.
Definition 1. A global equilibrium is a distribution of incomes, F ∗(.), such that
utility U(y, F ∗(.)) is maximized with respect to y for all incomes in its support.
One implication of this definition is that all individuals have the same utility in an
equilibrium. This equilibrium would not otherwise be stable in the sense that some
of the players would find it profitable to deviate. In other words, U(y, F (.)) should be
a constant in the interval [m,M ] associated with F (.), and lower than this constant
outside this interval.
This equal-utility condition implies that the derivative of U(y, F (.) with respect to y
is zero in the open interval ]m,M [, that is
−E ′(y) + α + βS(F (y)) = 0






Let us now study the way in which the bounds m and M are set. Consider
first the lower bound, m. For y < m, the derivative of U(.) with respect to y,
−E ′(y) + α + βS(0), should be positive or zero. Otherwise, m would not be the
lowest income. Symmetrically, for y > m, this derivative should be negative (since
S(F (y)) > 0). Consequently, we should have E ′(m) = α+, βS(0). Since E ′(0) = 0
and E ′(∞) =∞, this equation has a single solution, m∗.
Let us turn to the higher bound M . Above M , the derivative, −E ′(y)+α+β, should
be negative (as S(F (y)) = 1 for y > M). Below M , this derivative should be positive
(since S(F (y)) < 1). Consequently, the higher bound is the solution to E ′(y) = α+β.
Knowing the assumptions we made concerning the derivative of E(y), the previous
equation possesses one single solution, M∗.
It follows that




)) in the support [m∗,M∗] with m∗ being the solution to E ′(y) = α+βS(0)
and M∗ the solution to E ′(y) = α + β.
Note that this equilibrium is easy to derive. The bounds m and M are determined
by using the fact that F (m) = 0 and F (M) = 1 respectively. Between the two
extremes F ∗(y) is computed so as to make utility constant. It is worth mentioning
that, regarding the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium, the concavity of
GAS multiplier S(r) is not required.
4 Welfare
Hopkins and Korienko (2004) find that for any income distribution, the signalling
equilibrium is inefficient. The reason for this is that in their setting, conspicuous
consumption is not a purely positional good. Like non-positional consumption, con-
spicuous consumption also has an intrinsic value. In this case, laissez faire is dom-
inated by the conspicuous consumption that people would choose in the absence of
social concerns, which the authors refer to as the cooperative situation. As it is an
increasing function of income, cooperative conspicuous consumption reveal incomes.
In our setting where conspicuous consumption is a pure signal, their ”cooperative”
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level is zero for all incomes. Consequently the inefficiency that Hopkins and Korienko
emphasize does not make sense in our model. In our set up, we are led to treat the
signalling equilibrium as a constraint. In other words, the cost of making incomes
visible, associated with the second stage equilibrium, are seen as unavoidable.
4.1 Utilitarian (in)efficiency
Following the utilitarian principle, our criterion for social efficiency is the sum of




U(y, F (.))F ′(y)dy (14)
A simple way of comparing the laissez-faire equilibrium, F ∗(.) , with a social optimum
is by distributing the agents uniformly and continuously on the scale [0, 1]. Since the
distribution is uniform, the position, x, of an individual i in this interval, is also the
share of players whose positions are lower than x in this segment. Let y(x) be the
income of x-individuals (individuals of position x). One can see that any (strictly)
increasing and continuous income function, y(x), can be mapped on to an increasing
and continuous distribution function F (.) = y−1(.), and reciprocally.5 In this case,
the position x of an individual coincides with his/her rank r = F (y(x)) = x. Next,
suppose that y(x) is zero on the range [0, x1] and strictly increasing above x1. One can
see that the corresponding distribution function has a mass point in zero of frequency
x1. On the other hand, suppose that ]A,B[ is a hole of F (.). Since all incomes in this
interval have the same rank F (B) = F (A) = r, the income function is discontinuous
at x = r with y(r+) = B > y(r) = A. More generally, any non-decreasing income
function, y(x), defined on [0, 1], can be mapped into a distribution function, F (y).






5This results from the fact that for any random variable, X, of c.d.f. F (.), the random variable









From this, it can be deduced that when deciding on the income y(x) of x-individuals,
the planner maximizes




with respect to y(x), where x is given.
It is worth noticing that the social planner takes into account the fact that an increase
in y(x) lowers the utility of individuals whose ranks are higher (1 > t > x) by raising
their signalling costs.
As a consequence, the derivative of µ(x, y(x), [y(.)]1x) with respect to y(x) is
∂µ(x, y(x), [y(.)]1x)
∂y(x)
= −E ′(y(x)) + α + βS(x)− β(1− x)S ′(x) (17)
In this derivative, the term (1−x)S ′(x) measures the positive impact of an increase of
y(x) on the signalling costs of higher ranked individuals, while α+βS(x) is the positive
impact on individuals whose position is x. From the concavity of S(.) (S”(.) ≤ 0), it
follows that the impact on gross welfare Υ(x) = α+ βS(x)− β(1− x)S ′(x) is strictly
increasing in x.
For x = 0, the derivative, ∂µ(x, y(x), .)/∂y(x), will be negative if α+ βS(0) < βS ′(0)
and, positive if α + βS(0) ≥ βS ′(0). Remember that E(0) = E ′(0) = 0. Let us first
treat the case where α + βS(0) ≥ S ′(0). As Υ(x) is strictly increasing, we deduce
that the derivative of µ(x, y(x), .) with respect to y(x) for y(x) = 0 is strictly positive
for all x in ]0, 1]. In this situation a social optimum, denoted by ys(x), should satisfy
the following necessary and sufficient condition for all x in the interval [0, 1]:
∂µ(x, y(x), [y(.)]1x)
∂y(x)
= 0 = −E ′(y(x)) + α + βS(x)− β(1− x)S ′(x)
It can be verified that the optimal income function ys(x) is continuous and strictly
increasing on [0, 1]. This means that the rank of an ys(x)-individual coincides with
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his/her position, x, on the unit length segment. Consequently the previous (social)
optimality condition can be rewritten as
E ′(y(r)) = α + βS(r)− β(1− r)S ′(r) (18)
and the optimal distribution, F s(y), is the reciprocal of ys(r).
The social optimum F s(.) is strictly increasing. Its lower bound, ms, is the solution
to E ′(m) = α + βS(0) − βS ′(0) , while its higher bound is the solution to E ′(M) =
α + β . Notice that the social optimum has the same higher bound as a laissez-faire
equilibrium. The intuition behind this is that an increase in y(1) does not have an
impact on the utility of lower ranked individuals (by increasing signalling costs). On
the contrary, the minimum ms is lower than m∗ because a social planner knows that
an increase in y(0) has a negative impact upon the utility of all individuals.
Let y∗(.) denote the reciprocal of market equilibrium F ∗(.). This income function
satisfies
E ′(y∗(r)) = α + βS(r) (19)
Since E(y) is strictly convex, comparing equations (18) and (19) shows that the
laissez-faire income function, y∗(r), is above the socially optimal income function,
ys(r). Written in words, this means that laissez-faire generates incomes that are too
high. Once again, this is not surprising, since when deciding on his/her income, an
individual does not take into account that an increase in his/her income reduces the
utility of all higher-ranked participants by increasing their signalling costs.
Let us now show that this inefficiency also holds when α + βS(0) < βS ′(0);
hence where an increase of lower incomes strongly affects the signalling costs of other
participants.
The above analysis suggests that in this regime the (socially optimal) distribution
function will have a mass point in zero. Indeed, such a mass point is the means
of increasing the rank of strictly positive incomes in the hierarchy. To check for
this intuition we need to determine the equilibrium of the signalling game when
the distribution F (.) has a mass point in zero, meaning that a positive share of
the population, φ(> 0) has the same income, 0. For simplicity, it is assumed that
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individuals are only concerned about strictly lower incomes. In other words, having
equals adds nothing to their social position. Consequently, all 0-income participants
have the same social rank r = 0 = F (0)− φ.6
For obvious reasons, 0-individuals all have the same conspicuous consumption c(0) =
0. As their income is zero, they cannot announce a higher social rank than zero.7
Regarding higher-income individuals, it is easy to see that their conspicuous con-
sumptions are still derived from the truth-telling condition (equation (3)).8
The existence (and uniqueness) of the signalling equilibrium clearly holds true in the
presence of a mass point in zero. Consequently, we can consider the case in which the
social planner decides on a mass point in zero. In this circumstance, individuals with
a (strictly) positive income (in proportion (1−φ)) are distributed uniformly over the
segment [φ, 1]. Formally, we have y(x) = 0 for all x in the interval [0, φ]. The share
φ is set in such a way that (strictly) positive incomes increase social welfare. This
requires that the derivative
∂µ(r, y(r), [y(.)]1φ)
∂y(r)
= −E ′(y(r)) + α + βS(r)− β(1− r)S ′(r)
be strictly positive for r > φ and y(r) = 0. A necessary and sufficient condition is
that −E ′(0) + α + βS(0)− β(1− φ)S ′(0) = 0. Consequently, the utilitarian planner
decides on φs = 1 − α+βS(0)
βS′(0) . Below φ
s, (socially) optimal incomes, y(x), are zero,
hence lower than equilibrium incomes. Above r = φs, incomes ys(r) are still derived
from
E ′(y(r)) = α + βS(r)− β(1− r)S ′(r)
which implies that they also are lower than equilibrium incomes.
To summarize, we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 2. According to a utilitarian planner, the laissez-faire income function,
y∗(.), is above the socially optimal income function, ys(.).
6Assuming that r = F (0)− ρφ with 0 < ρ < 1 does not affect the analysis.
7Notice that, with a mass point Y > 0, the truth-telling condition would generate a discontinuity
of c(y) in Y . This discontinuity (c(Y +) > c(Y )) would compensate for the discrete increase of the
rank (F (Y )− F (Y −)). See the appendix.
8Their utility is strictly higher than zero, hence strictly higher than 0-individuals’ utility.
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We already know the origin of this inefficiency. Individuals do not take into account
the effect of their decision on the signalling costs of higher-ranked participants.
Laissez-faire equilibrium is not a utilitarian social optimum. On the other hand
one can see that, although agents are homogenous, this utilitarian optimum is not
egalitarian. In this utilitarian situation high-ranked individuals enjoy higher utilities
than low-ranked ones. As already noted, the intuition is that an increase in the
income of an individual (i) (negatively) affects high-ranked participants the more,
the lower the the rank of this individual (i). An expressive consequence is that a
utilitarian planner should assign a zero income to part of the population in order that
individuals with positive incomes reach a high social rank, thus increasing the (social)
marginal return to their incomes. This raises the following issue: how should a social
planner behave if he is not only utilitarian, but also egalitarian?
4.2 Egalitarian and Pareto efficiency
If egalitarian, the planner maximizes Σ(y(.)) subject to the constraint that all utilities
U(x, y(x), [y(.)]10) have some constant (endogenous) level, U
s. To solve the problem
of this egalitarian planner, we first observe that the solution, y∗(0), to −E ′(y) + α+
βS(0) = 0 generates a utility level, U∗(0) for 0-individuals which cannot be increased.
So the question is: Can higher-ranked participants reach this utility level? We already
know the answer to this question. Laissez-faire equilibrium is so constructed that all
individuals enjoy the same utility level U∗ = U∗(0). Consequently, U s = U∗ and we
have proved
Proposition 3. According to an egalitarian planner, laissez-faire equilibrium is so-
cially optimal.
It can be noted that this efficiency result is particularly relevant with identical agents.
It also shows how perceived inequality (income inequality) can coincide with true
equality (utility equality).
The fact that laissez-faire equilibrium is not a social optimum (according to the util-
itarian criterion) suggests that it is not Pareto efficient. The formal proof consists
of studying the effect on utilities of a small variation ∆ in all incomes in the neigh-
borhood of equilibrium F ∗(.). Since the income level associated with rank r becomes
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z(r) ≡ y∗(r) + ∆, with y∗(r) being the reciprocal of F ∗(.), utilities U(r, z(r), z(.)) can
be written as




Because the derivative dz(r)/dr coincides with dy∗(r)/dr, the variation in U(r, .), for
all r in [0, 1], is close to
[−E ′(y(r)) + α + βS(r)− βS(r)]∆
Now, from the equilibrium equation (Proposition 1), we deduce that, in the neigh-
borhood of laissez-faire, the previous expression reduces to: −βS(r)∆. This shows
that a small decrease in all incomes (∆ < 0) raises all utilities U(r, .). Considering
the case where all individuals (i) keep the same rank (r(i)) in [0, 1], this proves that
equilibrium, F ∗(.), is not a Pareto optimum. Lowering all incomes raises all utilities
U(r(i), .). The interpretation of this result follows the same line as our comment on
Proposition 2.
To summarize
Proposition 4. According to a Paretian planner, laissez-faire equilibrium is ineffi-
cient.
This result emphasizes the price that is paid for equality in an environment where
individuals are homogenous but are preoccupied with their social status.
4.3 Information and welfare
As already mentioned, earlier work usually focus on the determination and on the
efficiency of the signalling game. In particular, Hopkins and Horienko (2004) show
that an appropriate tax on positional consumption is capable of making laissez-faire
coincide with the cooperative case which corresponds to perfect information. When
incomes are exogenous, perfect information obviously improves welfare. Does this
hold true when incomes are endogenous? Let us compare the imperfect information
equilibrium (IIE) with the perfect information equilibrium (PIE). When all incomes
are observable, the status game has a single stage in which players maximize their
utility, Uˆ(y, F (.)) = −E(y) + (α + βS(F (y)))y, for a given distribution F (.). An
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equilibrium is a distribution Fˆ (.) such that Uˆ(y, Fˆ (y)) is maximized for any income
y in its support. Following the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Proposition
1, the condition for equal utilities implies that, for all r in ]0, 1[, the associated (PIE)
income function, denoted by yˆ(r), satisfies9
−E ′(y(r))y′(r) + (α + βS(r))y′(r) + βS ′(r)y(r) = 0 (20)
or, as 1/y′(r) = F ′(y(r)),
E ′(y(r)) = α + S(r) + S ′(r)F ′(y(r))y(r) (21)
On the other hand, we know that, for all r in ]0, 1[, the (IIE) income function, y∗(r),
satisfies E ′(y(r)) = α + βS(r)
As the effort function is strictly convex, we obtain the result that perfect information
increases the income y(r) for almost all r. The reason for this is that, in the absence
of signalling costs, the price paid for an income increase amounts to an increase in
effort. Consequently, perfect information tends to degrade (utilitarian) welfare by
strengthening the rat-race effect in the social competition game. On the other hand,
imperfect information creates signalling costs which are dead weight losses. We can
conclude that perfect information is not necessarily better for welfare.
5 A more general setting
So far we have made use of restrictive assumptions which rendered the analysis quite
simple. We now relax these assumptions and show that results are left unchanged.
Which means that the reader can focus on earlier developments and ignore any further
implications.
The extension that we develop here bears on the assumed properties of the income
distribution, F (.), where we allow for holes and mass points. There are different
reasons for this extension. First, what we actually showed above is that, assuming
that F (.) is continuous with a connected support, then the equilibrium distribution,
F ∗, does possess such properties. This is not sufficient. There may be an equilibrium
with holes and/or mass points. Next, to be perfect in Selten’s sense the equilibrium
9See Gavrel and Rebiere (2015).
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of the signalling sub-game should be defined for any income distribution. Finally,
how is the utilitarian optimum affected?
To address these issues we study the formation of a signalling equilibrium in the
presence of holes and discontinuities.
5.1 Signalling equilibrium
The appendix of the text proves the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Any distribution, F (.), is associated with a single signalling equilibrium,
c(., F (.)). Any positive mass point, A > 0, is mapped on to a discontinuity such
that c(A+, F (.)) > c(A,F (.)). Any hole, ]B,C[, translates into the constancy of
conspicuous consumption c(.) in this hole.
What makes these statements intuitive is that conspicuous consumption, c(y, F (.))
, actually reflects the rank in the income scale of an individual who earns income
y. Knowing that individuals whose income lies in a hole ]A,B[ have the same rank
R = F (B) = F (A), the truth-telling condition implies that all these individuals
have the same conspicuous consumption c(B) = c(A). It is worth noting that, if
expressed as a function of the rank, the derivative of positional consumption, c′(r),
jumps upwards on the right hand of R (c′(R+) > c′(R)). The reason is that the
impact on utility of an increase in the rank is the stronger, higher the income level.
As a consequence, in signalling equilibrium the marginal cost of such an increase
should increase with the income level.
The reason why a positive mass point A of frequency φ generates a discontinuity in
conspicuous consumption is easy to understand. Assuming that “having equals does
not add anything to individuals”, the social multiplier, S(.), jumps upwards in A by
the amount, S(F (A))−S((F (A)−φ)). The truth-telling condition then imposes that
conspicuous consumption also jumps upwards in A to discourage A-individuals from
imitating higher-income participants.
Once the existence and uniqueness of the signalling equilibrium has been set, we can
study the determination of a global equilibrium (reduced game of stage 1) as well as
the determination of a utilitarian optimum.
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5.2 Global equilibrium and utilitarian optimum
We first show that the condition for global equilibrium excludes holes as well as mass
points in (the support of) income distribution. To that end, we make use of the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. In any interval I where F (.) is either strictly increasing or constant
everywhere, the derivative of stage-1 utility, U(y, .), with respect to y reduces to
−E ′(y) + α + βS(F (y))
The formal proof is provided in Appendix A. It is straightforward if I is a hole, since
c(.) is constant in this case. If I belongs to the support of F (.), the lemma is derived
from the “marginal” truth-telling condition by applying the enveloppe theorem.
Lemma 3 plays a key role in ruling out mass points and holes. Let us here illustrate
this role by considering a mass point A > 0 of frequency φ > 0. We know from the
analysis above that in such a case, positional consumption is discontinuous in A with
c(A+) > c(A). From Lemma 3, we deduce that the two inequalities below should be
jointly satisfied.
−E ′(A) + α + βS(F (A)) ≤ 0
and
−E ′(A) + α + βS(F (A)− φ) ≥ 0
The first (second) inequality comes the fact that stage 1 utility should not increase
on the right (left) hand of mass point A. As the social rank jumps upwards in A
(r(A+)− r(A) = φ), these inequalities are a contradiction.
Appendix A also shows how holes in the income distribution are excluded. As a
consequence, in global equilibrium, income distribution is strictly increasing in an
interval [m,M ] with F (y) = 0 for y ≤ m and F (y) = 1, for y ≥ M . In other
words, F (.) necessarily possesses the assumed properties in global equilibrium. To
summarize, we can state the following
Proposition 5. Proposition 1 includes the case where the support of the income
distribution is not necessarily connected and where it possibly contains mass points.
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As for the utilitarian optimum, this extension is straightforward. This is because, as
explained in the determination of the utilitarian optimum, any mass point is mapped
on to the constancy of the income function y(.) in some sub-interval of unit length
segment. It is is easy to show that a hole of F (.) translates into a discontinuity of
the income function. Indeed, suppose ]A,B[ is a hole with F (A) = F (B) = R. On
the right hand side of R, the income function y(r) should be strictly higher than
income B whereas, on the left hand side, it should strictly lower than income A.
These two properties create constraints on the planner’s problem when this problem
is formulated as the selection of an optimal income function. We then obtain that
Proposition 2 also extends to the case where the support of income distribution is
not necessarily connected and possibly contains mass points different from zero. The
brief proof we provide for this extension is very laconic. To make it more intuitive,
Appendix C shows why positive mass points necessarily degrade welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper accounted for two behavioral hypothesis by building a two-stage status
game. The main insights are as follows. GAS behavior, the desire for advantageous
inequality, gives rise to income inequalities whether incomes are common knowledge,
as in Gavrel and Rebiere (2015), or private information, as in the present paper.
The GAS attitude generates equilibrium income dispersion in the same way as non-
sequential search induces equilibrium price dispersion in Burdett and Judd (1983).
Next, the “pure pride” version of social concern (Friedman and Ostroy, 2008) can be
seen as an outcome of the GAS attitude in the signalling sub-game. This provides an
interpretation for the assumption of cardinal social preferences. The average income in
the population of lower-ranked individuals coincides with the cost of making incomes
visible. Moreover, regarding welfare, market equilibrium is not a utilitarian optimum
because individuals do not internalize the impact of their income upon the signalling
costs of higher-ranked participants. But although it is not a Pareto optimum, laissez-
faire equilibrium is an egalitarian social optimum.
An interesting issue is the extent to which common knowledge of individuals’ incomes
is socially desirable. On the one hand, public information regarding everybody’s
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income reduces signalling costs (i.e. conspicuous consumptions) to zero. As these
costs are a dead-weight loss, this tends to improve welfare. On the other hand,
these costs tend to lower incomes which are too high relative to a utilitarian social
optimum. Taking a political economy perspective, this trade-off might help explain
why information on incomes is public in some countries, like Norway, but confidential
in others, like France.
Gavrel and Rebiere (2015) shows that, assuming that anyone’s rank in the income
scale is known of anybody, (pure) GAS equilibrium fairly well accounts for the distri-
bution of observed wages (in France). An interesting line for empirical investigations
would be to compare the empirical potential of the GAS hypothesis: whether in-
formation is perfect or imperfect. Knowing that with imperfect information GAS
generates Pride and that the Pride equilibrium is much simpler than the pure GAS
equilibrium, we can surmise that pure GAS is likely to be a better explanation of the
empirical intermediate wage distribution (for France).
To conclude, we would like to note that our analysis could be translated to other
fields, like industrial organization. For instance, consider firms who first decide on the
quality (the rank) of the goods they supply. Suppose then that, in a second stage, they
must let customers know this quality. A natural and practically relevant assumption
would be that these firms spend (conspicuous) amounts on any item, provided that
this expenditure is known to customers. This example shows that ordinal concerns are
not incompatible with pure rationality. Ordinal concerns can be instrumental. Notice
that, similar to Bilancini and Boncinelli (2014), in the presence of these advertising
(signalling) costs, firm’s reduced profits (deduced from the signalling sub-game) would
have a cardinal form. Profits would decrease with an increase in the quality of lower-
ranked goods which raises signalling costs. To some extent, researchers face the same
type of situation: producing papers whose value (rank) depends on their effort (among
other skills), and then making this value visible. Indeed, if the scholar is not sure
that his/her paper is good, he/she will not spend as much money in traveling costs
and other apparently futile expenses.
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Appendix A. A (more) general model: Game equi-
librium. Proof of Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Proposi-
tion 5
We here deal with the (more) general case where the support of F (.) possibly can
contain mass points and holes. In any interval of its support, F (.) is assumed to have a
strictly positive derivative. As a first step, we show that the existence and uniqueness
of the signalling equilibrium holds true for any distribution F (.) of this general class.
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We also prove that holes and mass points are excluded in game equilibrium. This
means that the assumptions made above can be relaxed without affecting the results
established in the text. In addition, the extension to holes and mass points means that
the two-stage game is well defined, in the sense that any strategy yi of an individual
i can be associated with a utility U(yi, .) for any strategies no the part of other
individuals (i.e. for any function F (.), as required in a perfect equilibrium.
Different cases must be distinguished. In each case, we show how the the truth-
telling condition determines conspicuous consumptions, point “a”. In other words,
we provide the proof of Lemma 2. Then, in each case, we ask the following question.
Is this case compatible with equilibrium in stage 1? The answer, which is always
negative, is given in point “b”. This proves Proposition 5.10 In Appendix B, we ask
the same question concerning a utilitarian optimum.
To that end, we begin with proving Lemma 3, which is used in point b.
Lemma 3. In any interval I in which F (.) is either strictly increasing or constant,
the derivative of stage-1 utility, U(y, .), with respect to y reduces to
−E ′(y) + α + βS(F (y))
Indeed, suppose that F (.) is constant in an interval I. Then, all individuals in this
interval have the same rank, R, hence the same conspicuous consumption, c(R).
Consequently, their utility U(y, .) is
U(y, .) = −E(y) + (α + βS(R))(y − c(R))
This proves Lemma 3 for this first case. Suppose now that F (.) is strictly increas-
ing in I. The marginal truth-telling condition then requires that the derivative of
V (z, y, c(.), F (.)) with respect to z is zero in z = y. Consequently
βS ′(F (y)F ′(y))(y − c(y))− (α + βS(F (y)))c′(y) = 0
This proves Lemma 3.
Case 1. Suppose F (.) is strictly increasing in a left hand neighborhood of A, constant
in the interval I =]A,B[ with B > A > 0, and strictly increasing in a right hand
neighborhood of B.
10We acknowledge that this exposition of proofs is not usual.
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-a) We first observe that what individuals make visible is not their income but their
rank. All incomes in I have the same rank R = F (A) = F (B). This imposes that all
individuals in this interval have the same conspicuous consumption.
Below A and above B, that is below R and above R, the derivative of V (z, y) with
respect to z should be equal to zero for z = y. This implies that
βS ′(R)(B − c(R))− (α + βS(R))c′(B+) = 0
and
βS ′(R)(A− c(R))− (α + βS(R))c′(A−) = 0
Notice that this means that c′(R+) is strictly greater than c′(R). The reason is that
the incentive to cheat is stronger with a higher income. In addition, these truth-
telling conditions ensure that an individual with an income y in I, whose rank is R,
will not be prompted to cheat. From this, it follows that we can define a signalling
equilibrium in the presence of the hole I, which also means that a reduced utility U(.)
can be associated with any y in I.
-b) From the previous equations, knowing that E(.) is strictly convex, we can deduce
that
−E ′(A) + α + βS(R) > −E ′(B) + α + βS(R)
This proves that the hole, I, is not not compatible with the definition of an equilibrium
in stage 1.
Case 2. We now turn to mass points. Suppose F (.) has a mass point A > 0 of
frequency φ > 0.
-a) All individuals with income A have the same rank, F (A)− φ whereas individuals
with incomes y > A have the rank F (y) ≥ F (A). The truth-telling condition requires
that A-individuals do not mimic individuals with higher incomes and vice-versa. This
implies that, for all y > A,
V (A,A, .) ≥ V (y, A, .)
and, reciprocally
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V (y, y, .) ≥ V (A, y, .)
S(.) is continuous. And the same holds for c(.) on both sides of A.11 Thus, as y
goes to A+, utility V (y, y, .) goes to utility (α+ βS(F (A)))(A− c(A+)), while utility
V (A, y, .) goes to (α + βS(F (A) − φ))(A − c(A)) = V (A,A, .) and utility V (y, A, .)
goes to (α + βS(F (A)))(A− c(A+)). From this, we deduce
V (A,A, .) = (α + βS(F (A)− φ))(A− c(A)) ≥ (α + βS(F (A)))(A− c(A+))
and,
(α + βS(F (A)))(A− c(A+)) ≥ (α + βS((F (A)− φ))(A− c(A)) = V (A,A, .)
It follows that
(α + βS(F (A)− φ))(A− c(A)) = (α + βS(F (A)))(A− c(A+))
In words the discontinuity of F (.) creates a discontinuity of c(.). The reason is that
the discrete increase in conspicuous consumption (c(A+)−c(A) > 0) compensates for
the upwards jump of the rank (F (A) − (F (A) − φ) = φ). This shows how (strictly)
positive mass points affect signalling equilibrium.
-b) Let us now turn to stage 1. E ′(.) and S(.) are continuous. From Lemma 2, we
deduce that, as y goes to A+, the derivative of stage-1 utility, U(y, .), with respect to
y, goes to
−E ′(A) + α + βS(F (A))
As a consequence of the definition of an equilibrium, F ∗(.), this limit should satisfy
−E ′(A) + α + βS(F (A)) ≤ 0
Similarly, since A > 0, we deduce
−E ′(A) + α + βS((F (A)− φ)) ≥ 0
11What follows also proves this statement.
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As φ > 0, the two previous inequalities are contradictory. This proves that F ∗(.)
cannot have strictly positive mass points.
Case 3. Suppose that 0 is a mass point of frequency φ > 0.
-a) All individuals with income 0 have the same rank, 0, whereas individuals with
incomes y > 0 have the rank F (y) ≥ φ. Since their income is zero, 0-individuals
cannot mimic individuals with higher incomes. Consequently, c(y) is continuous in 0.
As y goes to zero, c(y) goes to c(0) = 0.
-b) In the first stage, income 0 should be a maximum of U(y, F (.)). Therefore, the
derivative of U(y, .) with respect to y should be negative (or zero) in a right hand
neighborhood of 0, denoted by I. Using Lemma 2, we deduce that, for all y in I,
−E ′(y) + α + βS(F (y)) ≤ 0
As y goes to 0+, the previous derivative goes to
−E ′(0) + α + βS(φ) = α + βS(φ) > 0
This contradiction proves that an equilibrium at stage 1 cannot have a mass point in
zero.
From the analysis above, it emerges that, in equilibrium, the distribution of incomes,
F (.), has neither holes nor mass points. Hence F ∗(.) is strictly increasing in an
interval [m,M ]12. What was an assumption in the text turns out to be the main
result of Appendix A. This proves Lemmz 2 and Proposition 5.
Appendix B. A (more) general model: utilitarian
optimum
The purpose of Appendix B is to extend the determination of a utilitarian optimum to
the presence of holes and mass points. A simple but somewhat laconic proof amounts
to observing that mass points (different from zero) and holes create constraints on the
planner’s problem when this problem is formulated as selecting an optimal income
function y(x) on the segment [0, 1]. We believe that a more expressive proof would
12Since E′(∞) =∞, one can easily see that the support has an upward bound.
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be welcome. For the sake of brevity, we restrict ourselves to mass points. We show
that strictly positive mass points are not compatible with social optimality.
So, let us suppose that F (.) has a mass point A > 0 of frequency φ > 0. A first
subcase is F (A) = 1. Since A > 0, we can deduce that the utility of individuals
whose income is A, U(A) = −E(A) + [α+ βS((1−φ))][A− c(A)], is strictly positive.
This implies that −E ′(A) + [α + βS((1 − φ))][1 − c′(A)] = 0. Notice that, from
Appendix A, we know that a mass point A generates a discontinuity in c(.). This
does not mean however that c(A) is not differentiable with respect to A as a change
in A affects c(A) as well as c(A+). Let B denote an income level such that B > A.
We claim that redistributing individuals between incomes A and B improves welfare
for B close to A. Let bφ (1 ≥ b ≥ 0) be the share of B-individuals in total population
(normalized to one) - that is, the frequency of mass point B - and, (1 − b)φ, be the
share of A-individuals. The contribution of mass points A and B to social welfare,
W (b, B) ≡ (1− b)φU(A) + bφU(B), is
W (b, B) = (1−b)φ[−E(A)+(α+βS((1−φ)))(A−c(A))]+bφ[−E(B)+(α+βS((1−bφ)))(B−c(B))]
A important to point to notice here is that c(A) does not depend on B. Indeed,
according to the truth-telling condition, the determination of c(y) is backwards.13 In
contrast, c(B) actually depends on B (and b). The reason is that the truth-telling
condition14 implies that
V (B,A, .) = [α+βS((1− bφ))](A− c(B)) = [α+βS((1−φ))](A− c(A)) = V (A,A, .)
The previous relation determines B − c(B) which depends on B and b:
[α+βS((1−bφ))](A−c(B)) = [α+βS((1−bφ))](B−c(B))−[α+βS((1−bφ))](B−A)
= [α + βS((1− φ))](A− c(A))
13More precisely, this means that c(y) only depends on [F (z)]y0. The conspicuous consumption





Substitution into W (.) yields
W (b, B) = φ[−E(A)+(α+βS((1−φ)))(A−c(A))]−bφ[E(B)−E(A)]+bφ[α+βS((1−bφ))](B−A)
Consider the derivative of W (b, B) with respect to B, for B = A:
∂W (b, B)
∂B
= bφ[−E ′(A) + α + βS((1− bφ))]
Since S((1− bφ)) > S((1− φ)) for 0 < b < 1, it follows that, for 0 < b < 1,
bφ[−E ′(A) + α + βS((1− bφ))] > bφ[−E ′(A) + α + βS((1− φ))]
From the optimality of A, we derive that, for all b in [0, 1],
−E ′(A) + α + βS((1− φ)) ≥ −E ′(A) + [α + βS((1− φ))](1− c′(A)) = 0




This means that a mass point A > 0 such that F (A) = 1 cannot be a social optimum.
“Smoothing” the support of F (.) improves social welfare. Following the same line of
reasoning, it can be proved that other mass points A > 0 are not compatible with a
social optimum. The same holds for holes in the support of F (.) which are mapped
on to discontinuities of the income function, y(x).
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